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Defending conspiracy cases has never
been an easy ta sk . There were days in
which joint t rial s of 20, 30, 40, or
even 50 defendants were not uncommon , creating insuperable problems
for defense lawyers. 1 Even though
large joint-defendant trials are not as
common today,2 severe problems remain, particularly in light of the frequent use of the conspiracy charge at
the federal level. 3 In this article I will
discuss so me of the recent issues
which create special difficulties for
criminal defense lawyers. With regard
to these issues, there is, as some
would say, good news and bad news.

The Bad News

Proof of the Agreement
Proving an agreement, obviously
central to the conspiracy count, is
rarely a difficult task for the prosecution. There need not be an express
agreement and circumstantial evidence can be used to prove the
existence of the agreement . One
troublesome development, making
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By Paul Marcus

Is it 'mission impossible' today for the
defense lawyer in the
world of conspiracy
prosecutions?
the agreement even easier to prove, is
the so-called unilateral approach to
conspiracy. This approach was first
promoted by the drafters of the
Model Penal Code and has been
adopted by a number of state legislatures . The typical statute is much
the same as Section 8-2 of the Illinois
Criminal Code which provides:
"Conspiracy . (a) Elements of the
offense.
"A person commits conspiracy
when, with intent that an offense be
committed, he agrees with another to
the commission of that offense. No
person may be convicted of conspiracy to commit an offense unless
an act in furtherance of such agreement is alleged and proved to have

been committed by him or by a coconspirator.
"(b) Co-conspirators.
"It shall not be a defense to conspiracy that the person or persons
with whom the accused is alleged to
have conspired:
"(I) Has not been prosecuted or
convicted, or
"(2) Has been convicted of a different offense, or
"(3) Is not amenable to justice, or
"(4) Has been acquitted, or
"(5) Lacked the capacity to commit an offense."
The key difference between this
type of statute and the traditional
conspiracy statute is that under the
standard view the prosecution must
prove that two or more persons actually agreed. Under the unilateral
approach the prosecution need only
prove that this defendant agreed with
another person . In many cases that
will matter little . In some cases,
however, the di fference will be
significant. In a recent Indiana case,'
the defendant was intent on murdering her husband. She asked the aid of
two persons, one of whom was a
police detective, the other a police
agent. At no time did the officer or
the agent have any intent to commit
the murder. The defendant was con-
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victed of conspiracy to commit
murder because she had agreed to
commit the crime, even though the
other "conspirators" had not.
This view of conspiracy law has
been subject to considerable criticisms as the major rationale for the
conspiracy charge - the fear of group
activity - is nonexistent in such cases.
Nevertheless, a growing number of
states has adopted the approach and

as all charges are brought in a single
proceeding" the defendants could be
sentenced consecutively for violations
of the respective conspiracy
statutes. 12
The result in Rodriguez will create
severe difficulties for defense counsel
in drug conspiracy cases. Braverman
clearly held that a single agreement
could not be split into several agreements merely because it violated more
than one statute. As stated by Judge
Rubin in his dissenting opinion in

Rodriguez:

The result in
Rodriguez will create
severe difficulties for
defense counsel in drug
conspIracy cases.
many recent cases have followed it in
upholding the convictions of defendants who thought they were agreeing
with other people who were in fact
police agents.s

Cumulative Punishment, Multiple
Conspiracies
In Braverman v. United States, 7 the

"I see little difference between
fragmenting a conspiracy according
to the number and diversity of its objectives in order to charge several violations of a single statute, and using
the same technique to charge violations of two statutory provisions. The
teaching of Braverman is that a conspiracy cannot be so fragmented. "13
In spite of this criticism, however,
several circuits have utilized the
reasoning in Rodriguez l4 and the
Fifth Circuit itself has applied the
rule to drug conspiracies and conspiracies under the RICO statute
(Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations, 18 USC § 1961 , et

seq.) .IS

United States Supreme Court held Co-Conspirator Declarations
that a single agreement to commit
Statements made by co-conspirmore than one substantive crime ators during the course of and in fur"cannot be taken to be several therance of the conspiracy are adagreements and hence several con- missible at trial against the declarant
spiracies because it envisages the and any other members of the conviolation of several statutes rather spiracy. While the very nature of this
than one."8
rule has been subject to some
This ruling has been consistently criticism, it is a well-entrenched
followed in situations in which a feature of evidence law. Three aspects
single general conspiracy section is of it, however, are troublesome.
violated - 18 USC §37 I - or in which
First, what kind of evidence can be
there have been violations of the used to prove that the declarant and
general conspiracy statute along with the defendant were both members of
a more narrow conspiracy statute. s the ongoing conspiracy and to prove
When two specific conspiracy statutes that the statements were made in
have been violated, however, the furtherance of that conspiracy? Most
courts are far from consistent.
courts take the position that the hearThe most recent discussion of this say declaration itself cannot be used
issue was by the en banc Fifth Circuit to prove the membership in the conin United States. v. Rodriguez. 10 The spiracy. There is, however, a rather
defendants were charged with viola- ominous line of cases which suggests
ting two specific drug conspiracy that under the new Federal Rules of
statutes under Title 21 of the United Evidence hearsay evidence itself is adStates Code. 11 Only one agreement missible to prove the conspiracy.
was alleged . The court emphasized
For instance, in United States v.
Congress' intent to punish severely VincentI 8 the Sixth Circuit relied
violations of the drug laws. Because heavily on the fact that the finding
"the Double Jeopardy Clause im- with regard to the membership in the
poses no limits on Congress' power to conspiracy was a finding to be made
define the allowable unit of prosecu- by the trial judge rather than the jury.
tion and punishment, at least so long As a consequence, the judge is not
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"bound by the rules of evidence."
Hence, in the Sixth Circuit the trial
judges can rely on the hearsay statements themselves in determining the
membership in the conspiracy. If ever
there was potential for a bootstrapping admissibility finding, it certainly
exists today in the federal courts of
Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee.
Related to the problem of proving
the existence of the conspiracy and
membership in it is the manner of
presentation of evidence. As every experienced criminal defense lawyer
knows, the government is not first required to prove the existence of the
conspiracy and the membership in it
and then offer the hearsay statement
to the jury. To the contrary, the
general rule is that the trial judge, in
his or her discretion, may allow the
offer of the statement first. A limiting
instruction would then be given,
noting that the statement is "subject
to being connected up" by later proof
to the satisfaction of the trial judge.
Such a procedure is fraught with
great risk, as a later failure to "connect up" may not wholly eliminate
the impression the statement made on
the jurors' minds. In only one recent
case, however, was it suggested that
the trial judge first would be required
to find sufficient proof of the conspiracy before the statement could be
admitted. Ultimately, in that case the
Fifth Circuit en banc reversed .17
The final co-conspirator declaration issue concerns the use of statements where the defendant/ conspirator is currently on trial but the

The courts take the
position that the statement of the acquitted
co-conspirator is admissible.

declarant! co-conspirator was previ·
ously acquitted of the same COlspiracy charge. The courts take the
position that the statement of tl!(
acquitted co-conspirator is admissible. All the trial judge in the secold
trial must determine is that the decl.·
ant was a member of the conspiracy
and that he or she made the statemCil
in furtherance and during the coune
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of it. As stated by the Seventh Circuit: 18
"[T]he differences between what
must be proved to invoke the hearsay
exception and what must be proved in
order to convict a person of the crime
of conspiracy, a s well as the difference in burden of proof , mean that
neither collateral estoppel nor res
judicata automatically bars the use of
statements by a person who has been
acquitted of the crime of conspiracy .... ' ,
This rule makes sense becau se the
burdens of the government are very
different; the prosecution mu st only
make a prima facie showing, or
demonstra te by a preponderance of

.. .the serious potential
in federal prosecutions
for the unilateral approach does not exist
at this time.
the evidence , that a statement was
made during the course of and in
furtheran ce of the c on s piracy .
Nevertheless, as a matter of policy it
is somewhat difficult to justify thi s
rule. After all, a jury found that the
government did not prove that the
defendant was a functioning member
of the co nspiracy when the statement
was supposed to have been made .
Considering the great weight given to
the co-conspirator's declaration in
many trials , this evidence may be
decisive .

The Slight Evidence Rule
Proof of guilt mu st be personal.
The government mu st prove, beyond
a reasonable doubt, that this defendant committed the crime. Is it possible, then, that " [o]nce the existence
of a con spiracy is establi shed, even
slight evidence connecting a defendant to the conspiracy may be sufficient proof of hi s involvement in the
scheme"? Not only is such a view
possible, but it is the prevailing law in
most circuits. As the Eighth Circuit
pointed out in the above quote , the
essence of the proof requirement goes
to the establishment of the conspiracy , rather than the connection of
the defendant to it. ,g Sometimes this
"slight evidence rule " is formulated
differently:
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"Once the ex ist ence of a cons piracy is es tablished, eviden ce
establishing beyond reasonable doubt
a connection of a defendant with a
con spiracy, even though the connection is slight, is su fficient to convict
him with knowing participation in the
con spiracy. Thus, the word 'slight'
properly modi fies 'connection ' and
not 'evidence .' I t is tied to that which
is proved , not to the type of evidence
or the burden of proof. "20
The rationale behind the rule is
hard to justify , no matter how formulated . It states that appellate review is
limited to determining whether slight
evidence existed , not to whether there
was substantial eviden ce to s upport a
finding of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt as to thi s individual defendant.

such an analysis is th at the va lidity o f
the remaining count s ma y ha ve great
significance. The y ma y be parti cularl y important in determining
parole dates , jurisdiction under
recidivi s m sta tutes, and th e like .
Thu s, to apply th e doctrine in a
routine way so as to avoid the legal

... to apply the doctrine
in a routine way ... can
often be extremely
damaging to the
defendant.

The Concurrent Sentence Doctrine
Let us suppose the common situation . The defendants are convicted of
di stribution (or possess ion) of narcotics and conspiracy to distribute the
drugs . The sentences given for the
two charges are concurrent rather
than consecutive. The defendants appeal. Focusing it s attention on one of
the counts - and it does not truly matter whi ch - the appellate court concludes that there is no error with
regard to that count. Will the defendant then have review in the appellate
court of the second count?
In most cases the answer is no ; appl ying the concurrent sentence doctrine most courts will say it is unnecessary to look to the claim s with regard to the remaining count. These

The co-conspirator
declaration is an
established exception
to the hearsay rule.

courts are not required to end their
inquiry if the evidence on one count is
proper. Instead they are allowed to
find that, as a matter of discretion,
"it is 'unnecessary' to consider all the
allegation s made by a particular party."2'
Many courts simply apply the concurrent sentence doctrine in a mechanistic way and hold that if anyone
count is sufficient and the sentences
are to run concurrently they will not
go any further. The difficulty with

issues rai sed can often be extremely
damaging to the defendant. Nevertheless , a good many courts apply the
doctrine in precisely that way.n

The Good News
Up to thi s point I have painted a
rather stark portrait of the problem s
faced in defending con spiracy cases .
There is some good news, however.

Proof of the Agreement
Most court s do reject the unilateral
conspiracy view and rely on the traditional view that "the crime of conspiracy requires a conce rt of ac tion
among two or more person s for a
common purpose ... . "23 Moreover,
the serious potential in federal prosecutions for the unilateral approach
does not exi st at this time. The standard view under both the general conspiracy section and the Title 2 I drug
conspiracy provision s is that proof of
a " true agreement " conspiracy is required . Under the early draft s of the
proposed revised criminal code, however , the Model Penal Code unilateral
approach to conspiracy would have
been adopted. In the most recent proposal put forth the unilateral approach has been rejected . 24

Cumulative Punishment, Multiple
Conspiracies
While the en banc disposition in
Rodriguez will no doubt send chills
down the spines of the defense lawyers who see double conspiracy
charges, the Supreme Court as yet has
not spoken to this point. Further,
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Judge Rubin's dissent is a telling one,
focusing on the rationale behind
Braverman. At this time there is no
clear indication that the Rodriguez
view will prevail throughout the
country . At least two other circuits
have expressly rejected the reasoning
of the Fifth Circuit. 25

the admissibility of his or her out-ofcourt declaration. The trial judge
will, however, look to the acquittal
"as relevant and persuasive in the
determination of whether the government has demonstrated the requisite
criminal joint venture. "2g

likelihood that the defendant will suf·
fer adverse collateral consequences
from the unreviewed conviction."32
The Second Circuit was even more
direct when it noted that "utilization
of the concurrent sentence doctrine is
now the exception rather than the
rule. "33

The Slight Evidence Rule
Co-Conspirator Declaration
The co-conspirator declaration is
an established exception to the hearsay rule. 26 And, more importantly, it
is heavily used in conspiracy prosecutions. Still, the concerns expressed
above may not be as serious as they
appear. While the Sixth Circuit allows the use of hearsay to establish
the conspiracy and its membership,
most other courts do not. Most courts
say that the "out-of-court statement
itself may [not] be considered by the
trial judge in determining its admissibility. "27
The second co-conspirator declaration problem relates to the order of
proof. This continues to be an area of
concern, as in many cases the declaration comes in well before the supporting evidence is found by the trial
court. Still, if the proper connection
is not made and instructions are not
likely to cure the harm, the mistrial
remedy always is available . Also,
even though the order of the proof is
within the discretion of the trial
court, some courts are now stating
that the "preferred" order of proof is
to have the foundation laid for the

'I cannot bring myself
to believe that upon
appellate review only
'slight evidence' is required to connect a
particular defendant
with a conspiracy.'
declaration allowing conditional admission only when necessary. 28
The problem of the acquitted declarant - while not terribly rare - is
not all that significant as a practical
matter. In most cases the declarant in
a prior trial is not acquitted. Indeed,
in most cases, the declarant and the
defendant are jointly on trial so the
situation will not arise. In the case in
which the declarant has been acquitted it is true that most courts will not
say that there is a per se rule against
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We finally come to an area where
the good news is clearly overwhelming the bad news. The good news
comes from the Fifth Circuit in an en
banc opinion which is likely to have
very significant impact. Judge Coleman in a panel decision stated:
"I cannot bring myself to believe
that upon appellate review only
'slight evidence' is required to connect a particular defendant with a
conspiracy. 'Substantial evidence'
should be, and I believe is the test. "30
In the en banc disposition of the
case the other twelve judges of the
Fifth Circuit agreed. In an opinion
written by Judge Coleman the court
stated:
"We are convinced that when the
sufficiency of the evidence to support
any criminal conviction, including
conspiracies, is challenged on appeal
the correct standard of review is
substantial evidence, it being understood, of course, that the evidence is
to be viewed in the light most
favorable to the government. The
'slight evidence' rule as used and applied on appeal in conspiracy cases
since 1969 should not have been
allowed to worm its way into the
jurisprudence of the Fifth Circuit. it
is accordingly banished as to all appeals hereafter to be decided by this
court. "31

The Concurrent Sentence Doctrine
This doctrine is applied all too
often to limit the substantive legal
challenges by conspiracy defendants.
I n recent years, however, more attention has been given to the adverse collateral consequences which can arise
from the unreviewed convictions.
Several courts now have advised the
district judges that they will review all
claims in the normal situations.
"Despite such statements, we have
often applied the doctrine mechanically without really considering the
adverse consequences. Because it may
have been unclear in our past cases,
we now expressly hold that a court
may not apply the concurrent
sentence doctrine at least in the situation where there is a significant

Conclusion

Is it "mission impossible" today
for the defense lawyer in the world of
conspiracy prosecutions? No, the
good news in some of the important
areas does help to balance out the bad
news. However, it is still very difficult
for the criminal defense lawyer who is
handling a conspiracy case. In addi·
tion to the matters discussed above.
there are numerous other matters
which raise concerns for the defense

... the heightened use
of the conspiracy
charge .. .is a powerful
weapon in the prosecution's arsenal.

including prosecutions under the very
broad RICO statute34 and so-called
Bruton problems. 35 There is good
reason for the heightened use of the
conspiracy charge, especially in joint
trials . The reason is that it is a power·
ful weapon in the prosecution's
arsenal:
"It is obvious why some pros·
ecutors, with our aid and comfort ,
are enamoured bringing allegations
of mass conspiracy. No matter how
thin the proof as to individual defen·
dants, once the jury has looked at the
sheer numbers involved and has been
shocked by the extensive evidence of
criminal activity by a remote actor,
the chance that they [sic] will pay
serious attention to the absence of
substantial proof as to one individual
is not particularly great. A doctrine
which permits this impairs lib·
erty."3~T

(see References, page 86)
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